The New Architecture of African Agency
In late September, amid the loud statements Africa’s Agenda at the 81st United Nations General Assembly, a quiet but profound political development took place: the African Union (AU) Commission signed a memorandum of understanding with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This document is just one of the major steps in Africa’s actively evolving foreign policy.
Moving Beyond the Western Consensus
Founded in 2001, the SCO comprises China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, and the Central Asian republics. Originally focused on border security and counter-terrorism in the region, the group has emerged as a geopolitical club and a counterweight to the US-led Western liberal order.
While partnering with the SCO could be seen as a move away from Western institutions, a more accurate analysis would frame it as a hedge against external influence. The traditional Western-led architecture has long treated Africa as a subject of policy, where conditions attached to EU trade agreements or IMF bailouts have often constrained the continent’s fiscal autonomy. Conversely, the SCO operates on a principle of non-interference.
This pivot, however, is not necessarily a move toward the East. The binary ‘East-West’ dependency has characterized Africa’s engagement with the world for too long. This new partnership suggests a third path, one where Africa can engage with a transcontinental bloc on its own terms. The significance of the AU-SCO memorandum, therefore, lies in the architecture of agency. As African economies seek to diversify supply chains, aligning with non-Western security and economic architectures goes beyond ideology and follows basic common sense.
Africa’s Voice in the BRICS Expansion
The new direction also aligns with data reflecting global power and economic shifts. According to the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), intra-BRICS trade has grown more than 13-fold since 2003 to $1.17 trillion in 2024, outpacing trade with Africa’s traditional G7 partners.
For African leaders, BRICS membership also offers liquidity without the ‘good governance’ conditionality that often accompanies Western capital. But the full calculus is more nuanced.
Originally an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, BRICS expanded in 2024 to include Egypt and Ethiopia - two of Africa’s diplomatic heavyweights. Together with South Africa, which has served as the continent’s anchor in the group since 2011, the AU now has a de facto majority bloc within BRICS. This can transform Africa from a passive ‘recipient of cooperation’ into a voting bloc that can sway the direction of the Global South alliance.
From Vladivostok to Moscow
African representation at recent international forums underscores this new strategic shift. At this year’s Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) in Vladivostok, African delegations were notably more prominent than in the past. Russia views Africa as an important partner in the face of Western sanctions, and Russia’s grain exports to Africa have remained stable despite the Black Sea crisis.
The EEF could be seen as a prelude to the highly anticipated Russia-Africa Forum, set to take place in Moscow in October 2026.
Russia’s total trade turnover with Africa reached $27 billion in 2025, a twofold increase over the preceding decade, and is growing rapidly. While Moscow is working with traditional major partners such as Egypt and Algeria, and growing ties with South Africa, Morocco, Tunisia and Nigeria, the AU’s overarching framework attempts to ensure that the continent’s engagement with Russia serves the Pan-African agenda, not just individual regimes.
Pan-African Power Distribution
The AU’s push toward multilateralism - evident in the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) - is designed to prevent a return to the era of bilateral deals undermining continental integration.
Through fostering partnerships with BRICS and the SCO and forging new agreements at the Russia-Africa Forum, the AU aims to perform a delicate balancing act: distributing the benefits of international deals across the continent while managing the divergent interests of 55 member states.
The long-term results remain to be seen, but the days of Africa as a rule-taker in a Western-dominated world are fading. The continent is leveraging its demographic weight, resource wealth, and diplomatic solidarity to rewrite the rules of engagement. The result is a multipolar world where Africa, perhaps for the first time ever, could be writing its own rules.
